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OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Sara L. Doolin filed a medical malpractice complaint against James V. Kasin, 
M.D., Gregory Moorman, M.D., and the Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital and Medical 
Center.  Upon the defendants‟ motion, the district court dismissed Doolin‟s complaint.  
The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Doolin had not 
complied with the pre-filing requirements of the Virgin Islands statute governing medical 
malpractice actions, 27 V.I.C. §166i.   Doolin v. Kasin, 2009 WL 258738 at *2-3 (D.V.I. 
Aug. 19, 2009).
1
  Doolin then filed this appeal.   However, we need not address the merits 
of the district court‟s jurisdictional holding.   Instead, for the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the district court‟s order and will remand for the district court to determine 
whether it had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
FACTS 
 Doolin, a nurse and resident of the state of Florida, was recruited in June of 2005 
to assist in the formation of an open heart surgery program at the Governor Juan F. Luis 
Hospital and Medical Center in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands (the “Hospital”).  
While in St. Croix, she detected a small nodule on her right breast.  On August 26, 2005, 
Gregory Moorman, M.D., an obstetrician-gynecologist, performed a biopsy on the 
nodule.   Dr. Moorman sent the specimen to James V. Kasin, M.D., a pathologist, for a 
determination of the nature of the specimen.    
                                              
1
 Those requirements are discussed in the district court‟s opinion and need not be 
repeated here.  2009 WL 2578738 at *2.   
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  Kasin examined the specimen and prepared a pathology report in which he 
concluded that Doolin had focal intraductal carcinoma accompanied by fibrocystic 
changes, i.e., breast cancer.  Kasin sent the report to Moorman who relayed the results to 
Doolin.  Drs. Moorman and Kasin are employees of the Hospital. 
 On September 9, 2005,  Doolin traveled to Owensboro, Kentucky, to consult with 
a surgeon, Dr. Gerald Edds, about her diagnosis.  Based on Kasin‟s report, Edds 
scheduled Doolin for an immediate lumpectomy.  Dr. George Gilliam performed the 
lumpectomy at Owensboro Mercy Health System on or about September 9, 2005.  
Neither the specimen removed during the lumpectomy, nor the post surgical 
mammogram showed evidence of cancer.  Nevertheless, Gilliam, in reliance on the Kasin 
report, referred Doolin to an oncologist to receive precautionary treatment.  The 
oncologist to whom Doolin was referred performed tests on the original pathology slides 
that Kasin had prepared and determined that Doolin had never had cancer and that Kasin 
had misdiagnosed her.    
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On June 15, 2007, Doolin filed a copy of her proposed complaint with the Medical 
Malpractice Review Committee pursuant to 27 V.I.C. § 166i.
2
  On June 28, 2007,  Doolin 
filed the complaint in the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, against Kasin, 
Moorman and the Hospital, seeking to be compensated for pain and suffering related to 
her misdiagnosis and for having to undergo unnecessary treatments, including 
medications and surgery.   
                                              
2
 See n.1, supra.   
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 Kasin, Moorman and the Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment 
challenging the district court‟s jurisdiction on two grounds.  First, they argued that 
Doolin‟s failure to comply with the pre-filing requirements of the Virgin Islands statute 
governing medical malpractice claims, 27 V.I.C. § 166i, deprived the district court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Second, they argued that diversity jurisdiction does not exist 
because the Hospital is a part of the government of the Virgin Islands.   
 The district court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss 
because the motion contested the district court‟s subject matter jurisdiction and did not 
ask for a decision on the merits of Doolin‟s action.  2009 WL 2578738 at *1, n.1.  As 
noted, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because of Doolin‟s failure to comply with the pre-filing requirements of the 
Virgin Islands statute.  It did not address the defendants‟ argument that there is no 
diversity jurisdiction.    
 Based upon our concern that the district court may not have had diversity 
jurisdiction, we directed the Clerk to send the following letter to counsel, and asked them 
to address that issue: 
In 1990, the Virgin Islands enacted legislation divesting the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands of original jurisdiction for 
local civil matters by vesting that jurisdiction in territorial 
courts.  See 4 V.I.C. § 76(a); see also Edwards v. Hovensa, 
LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, the 
District Court‟s jurisdiction must be grounded in either 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1332 or federal 
question jurisdiction under § 1331.  See 48 USC § 1612(a).  
Although the defendants asserted in their motion for summary 
judgment that diversity jurisdiction was lacking, the District 
Court did not address the issue.  If the District Court did not 
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have diversity jurisdiction, then we also lack jurisdiction.  
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 
(1986) (restating that “„if the record discloses that the lower 
court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, 
although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When 
the lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have 
jurisdiction on the appeal, not of the merits but merely for the 
purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in 
entertaining the suit.‟”) (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 
U.S. 435, 440 (1936)); Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 
1519 (3d Cir. 1992).  In light of the above, the parties are 
directed to file supplemental letter briefs addressing whether 
the District Court had diversity jurisdiction.  The letter briefs 
may not exceed seven pages and shall be filed on or before 
November 8, 2010.  
 
Counsel have complied with our request. 
 
DISCUSSION 
A. Did the district court have 
diversity jurisdiction?
3
 
 
 Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between 
 
(1) citizens of different States; 
 
**************** 
 
(e) the word “States,” as used in this section, includes the 
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico. 
                                              
3
 “We exercise plenary review in determining whether the district court was vested with 
subject matter jurisdiction.”  Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted).   
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (e).   
 As noted, Doolin is a citizen of Florida.  Kasin and Moorman are citizens of St. 
Croix, United States Virgin Islands.   The Hospital is owned by the Government of the 
Virgin Islands.  
 “There is no question that a State is not a „citizen‟ for purposes of the diversity 
jurisdiction.”  Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).  “At the same time, 
however, [the Supreme] Court has recognized that a political subdivision of a state, 
unless it is simply „the arm or alter ego of the State,‟ is a citizen of the State for diversity 
purposes.”  Id. (footnote and citations omitted).  The same rule applies to the territories, 
including the Virgin Islands.  Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).    
 In determining whether alter ego status is appropriate, a court must perform the 
same analysis as is required to determine Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Blade v. 
Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 726 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1979).    In Benn v. First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania, 426 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2005), we set forth the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity analysis: 
[T]o determine whether a suit against an entity is actually a 
suit against the state itself, we must consider: (1) the source 
of the money that would pay the judgment (i.e., whether that 
source would be the state); (2) the status of the entity under 
state law; and (3) the degree of autonomy the entity has. 
 
Id. at 239 (citation omitted).   The three factors are co-equal and no one factor has 
primacy.   Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).   
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 In his responsive letter brief, Doolin‟s counsel contends that the Hospital is a 
separate operating entity from the Government of the Virgin Islands for purposes of 
subject matter jurisdiction and is, therefore, a “citizen” and a proper diverse party to this 
litigation.  He has attached an appendix to his letter brief that contains documents which 
were produced by the Hospital in response to his interrogatories and document 
production requests.  Doolin‟s counsel believes these documents demonstrate that the 
Hospital is organized as a separate entity and corporation run without interference or 
operational oversight by the Government of the Virgin Islands, and he has included 
numerous exhibits to support that contention including the Hospital‟s bylaws, and other 
documents that he contends show that the hospital functions as a private entity.   For all 
of these reasons, Doolin‟s counsel contends that all records produced by the Hospital  
show that it is financially independent without reliance on the government, pays its own 
debts and generates its own revenues such that it would pay any judgment from its own 
revenues.  
 However, we do not believe that Doolin‟s  counsel‟s submission demonstrates that 
the Hospital is a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes.   Significantly, although he 
claims that the Hospital has the capacity to pay a judgment against it, he offers no 
authority for that claim other than his own ipse dixit to that effect.   
 Of course, the Hospital, Kasin and Moorman claim that the Hospital is owned by 
the Government of the Virgin Islands without separate legal status and, therefore, it is not 
a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.  That claim is based on  an unreported 
district court case, Hospital Resource Management, L.C. v. Gov. Juan F. Luis Hospital 
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and Medical Center and the Virgin Islands Hospital & Health Care Facilities Corp., No. 
2003/0056 (D.V.I. June 7, 2004).  
 It appears that Hospital Resources in the only case addressing the issue of whether 
the Hospital can be a considered a citizen for diversity purposes.  Based on that case, one 
could conclude that a suit against the Hospital is a suit against the Government of the 
Virgin Islands and/or that the Hospital is  an alter ego or arm of the Government of the 
Virgin Islands.  Either way, the Hospital is not a citizen for diversity purposes. 
 However, the court in Hospital Resources did not determine whether any 
judgment against the Hospital would be paid by the Government of the Virgin Islands, 
which is one of the factors in the Benn Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis. 
Therefore, we do not believe that Hospital Resources is as authoritative as defendants 
claim.    Accordingly, we must remand this case to the district court for it to apply the 
Benn factors and determine whether the Hospital is a citizen for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. 
 Counsel for the Hospital, Kasin and Moorman contends that Doolin‟s action must 
be dismissed in its entirety because the Hospital is not a citizen for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.  However, Kasin and Moorman are citizens of St. Croix and are diverse 
parties as to Doolin, who, as noted, is a citizen of Florida.  Therefore, should the district 
court determine that the Hospital is not a citizen for diversity purposes, it must then 
determine whether the Hospital can be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 so that the 
action can continue against Kasin and Moorman or whether the Hospital is an 
indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19, in which case the action must be dismissed in 
9 
 
its entirety.
4
  See Newman-Green Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larraine, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989).   
CONCLUSION 
 For  the above reasons, we will vacate the district court‟s order dismissing 
Doolin‟s action because of her failure to comply with the pre-filing requirements of 27 
V.I.C. § 166i, and will remand the matter for the district court for it to determine whether 
it has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
5
 
                                              
4
 Under Rule 21, district courts have the authority to retain jurisdiction by dropping a 
non-diverse party, provided that the party is not indispensable.  Parties are indispensable 
if “„in the circumstances of the case [they] must be before the court.‟”  Steel Valley 
Authority v. Union Switch and Signal Division, 809 F.2d 1006, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting 3A  J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 19.02). In other words, indispensable 
parties are “„persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of 
such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or 
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its leaving may be wholly inconsistent 
with equity and good conscience.‟” Id. (quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 
130, 139 (1854)). 
 
5
 As we stated at the outset, we have not addressed the merits of the district court‟s ruling 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Doolin‟s failure to comply with the 
pre-filing requirements of 27 V.I.C. § 166i.  Nonetheless, we note that neither of the 
parties nor the district court analyzed the jurisdictional question regarding § 166i by 
applying Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), and its progeny, which have recognized 
that statutory requirements may qualify as jurisdictional requirements, claims processing 
rules, or time-related directives.  In the event the district court concludes that diversity 
jurisdiction exists, whether § 166i is jurisdictional in nature should be analyzed in light of 
Kontrick and its progeny. 
